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The Last Refuge
of the Rogue
By WM. HEDGES ROBINSON, JR.
It had been a great treat to escape into the green coolness of the
country for an all-day picnic, thought Sheriff Tom .Bash peacefully as
he, his wife, her friend, and a deputy were driving back to Kansas City
on that hot August night. Two sharp revolver shots suddenly interrupted his peacefulness.
Bash pushed hard on the brakes. Before the car had come to a
stop, the deputy, gun in hand, was running across to an alley from which
the gunshots seemed to have come. Grabbing a riot gun from the rear
of the car, Bash sprinted after his deputy.
Ahead of them two men were trotting down the street. An automobile swung out of the darkness. Its two occupants opened fire on
the officers. The gangsters in the street joined in.
The officers, advancing, swung their riot guns into action. The
gangsters' car wobbled crazily across the street and bumped to a stop
against the curb-its driver and passenger dead.
One of the men in the street dodged between the houses and disappeared. The other threw his empty automatic to the ground and raised
his hands.
"For God's sake, don't shoot," he pleaded. "I'm a friend of
Johnny Lazia."
"I don't care whose friend you are, Charley Gargotta," replied
Bash, "but I don't shoot unarmed men."
After handcuffing Gargotta, the deputy picked up the gangster's
gun. Both officers examined it carefully, making mental notes by which
they could identify it in court.
Gargotta was indicted for the murder of Ferris Anthon, rival gangster. Tremendous pressure began to be exerted mysteriously to bring
freedom. Johnny Lazia, king of Kansas City's underworld, was alleged to be close to the political powers in that city.
In April when the state presented its case, Bash and the deputy told
their story and identified the death weapon. A local ballistics expert
stated that bullets found in the body of Anthon came from the identified
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gun. The city detective who had investigated the killing then came to
the stand.
He gave some startling evidence. There was a mistake, he said.
The real death weapon he had picked up between the houses where the
unknown gangster had fled.
"I made out a tag for it," he testified. "I forgot to
put it on.
Let's see, I've got the tag somewhere. Yes, here it is."
The detective handed over a police identification tag to the amazed
district attorney. Shortly afterwards a woman testified for the defense
that Gargotta on that August night had been at her apartment, which
was near the scene of the murder.
According to her story, Charley left the apartment a few minutes
after they heard the shooting, to see what was occurring. Gargotta
claimed that he was an innocent bystander. Because of this perjured
alibi, a jury freed him.
This Kansas City case presented a type of alibi very frequently used.
Recently I made a survey of all the reported criminal cases of the last
twenty-years involving an alibi. In approximately 85 per cent of those
cases, alibi testimony was offered by relatives, sweethearts, or friends;
and of that percentage, alibi testimony was given by members of the
family in two-thirds of the cases. In other words, alibi testimony is
supplied by witness related by blood or affinity to the defendant in better
than 50 per cent of the criminal cases.
These figures become more significant when it is realized that under
our criminal procedure the state must prove its case beyond a reasonable
doubt. If the defendant's alibi raises any question as to his guilt, the
jury, under its instructions, must free him. It seems a relatively simple
thing for a defendant to create a doubt in the minds of the jurymen by
bringing to them sworn testimony of his family or friends that he was
elsewhere than at the scene of the crime. Perhaps no better illustration
of this fact had been brought so forcibly to the attention of the public
than the attempt which was made in the Hauptmann case.
It was essential that Hauptmann be able to establish three different
alibis. A shocking array of psychopathics, convicted criminals, and dope
fiends paraded to the stand to establish alibis in the closing days of that
trial. But the main items of the alibis were testified to by Hauptmann
and his wife. Mrs. Hauptmann swore that her husband was in Christian Fredricksen's bakery waiting for her until nine o'clock the night of
the kidnapping. She also stated that her husband was at home enjoying
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music with friends on the evening when the ransom money was paid.
These alibis were vigorously asserted by Hauptmann, who added that on
the November night when the ransom bills were passed, he was many
miles from the place where they were circulated. Many persons swore
to similar facts. This barrage of perjury has resulted in four perjury
indictments.
While the Hauptmann case was more theatrical than most criminal
cases, one does not have to search long to find families deliberately falsifying testimony in an attempt to liberate some member from the law.
An ex-convict by the name of Reilly robbed Arthur Heisman of his car
and his companion of some valuables. The car, stripped, was found by
the Chicago police in a private garage which Reilly had rented previously.
In spite of the fact that Heisman, his companion, and the owner of the
garage positively identified Reilly, he claimed an alibi, which, as the
judge observed, was supported entirely by witnesses related to him by
blood or affinity.
The gangster's "moll"-in fact, wives and sweethearts from any
stratum of life-frequently establish faked alibis. One of the main
parts they play in modern criminal gangs is to furnish hideouts, such as
Evelyn Frechette did for Dillinger or Helen Gillis did for "Baby Face"
Nelson; or to supply alibis, as Vi Mathis did for Verne Miller.
There is the case of Willie Stanley's girl, a negress living in a small
southern town. A large number of state's witnesses had said that Willie
Stanley had fatally stabbed Willie Sadler, who had testified against the
Stanleys in a civil suit. But Willie Stanley's girl swore that he was at
her place when the stabbing occurred.
The lies of friend and family frequently swear a defendant out of
trouble. In a large percentage of the cases, faked documents are relied on
for an alibi. This is the second favorite variation of the alibi theme. It
occurred in approximately ten per cent of the cases studied.
This type of alibi is found in three general forms. Post cards or
letters mailed from some far-away place on the day the crime was committed. A hotel register showing that the defendant was registered at a
hotel in another city during the period in question. Miscellaneous dated
receipts, generally for garage repairs or storage, tending to prove the
defendant's presence elsewhere than at the scene of the crime.
The post card alibi is a favorite trick. It was used, along with alibis supplied by relations, as one item of the defense of the Touhy gang
in the Hamm kidnapping case. The defense introduced in evidence a
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postal card written by one of the defendants and postmarked from a
western city about the time the kidnapping occurred. This post card,
together with depositions of relatives and employees of the defendants
claiming that the defendants were elsewhere, constituted the defense.
A jury acquitted the Touhy gang for this crime, but they were promptly
convicted in Chicago for the Factor kidnapping.
The government postmark apparently carries considerable weight
with juries. But a jury frequently fails to realize that alibis may be
arranged for in advance, and that some member of the gang, and not the
defendant, might have dropped the postal card in the letter box in
another city according to a pre-arranged plan. In fact, a legitimate commercial concern in New York will guarantee to mail letters from any part
of the world.
Another frequently used form of the document alibi is a forged
hotel register. A Seattle case illustrates this criminal technique. The
Paulsen Building in Seattle had been robbed on July 24th by an experienced burglar. Because of the manner by which the job was accomplished, police suspected Edelstein, a noted West Coast safe breaker.
When Edelstein was arrested in San Francisco, he said he had an alibi,
but refused to divulge it. To be on the safe side, however, Edelstein
attempted to bribe the guards with large amounts of money and jewels
to obtain his freedom.
On the day of the trial a register from a Lincoln, Nebraska, hotel
was introduced in evidence, showing that Edelstein had been a guest of
the hotel on July 20th and for several 'days thereafter. Unfortunately
for Mr. Edelstein, the forgery was not a very good job, for it was apparent to the judge and the jury that some other signature had been erased
before Edelstein had signed his name.
The third general form of the document alibi is forged receipts. To
illustrate, while robbing a Chicago cafe on June 20th, Lenhardt killed
the proprietor. During his trial, he produced a receipt dated June 20th
from a garage in Cleveland. The garage proprietor testified that the
work was done on the date shown on the bill. If it had not been that
the district attorney had been able to locate quickly an employee who
stated that the car was actually repaired the following February, a jury
would probably have acquitted another murderer.
One other type of alibi defense which is fairly common depends
upon faked medical records or testimony, and perhaps upon both. To
illustrate, O'Connor was on trial for the robbery in October of a Louis-
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ville tobacco company payroll. He claimed that his knee had been badly
fractured in September and that he had been confined to the bed for several months. Certain medical testimony tended to substantiate this
statement. O'Connor, however, overlooked the fact that a short time
after the robbery he had been booked on a breach of peace charge. When
an appellate court judge affirmed a sentence of conviction, he remarked
dryly, "Men so crippled do not usually figure in breaches of peace."
Day after day, perjury to substantiate these various alibis occurs in
our courts. Students of criminal procedure have variously estimated
that perjury is present in 75 to 90 per cent of criminal cases. Indeed,
certain persons are infamous for their ability to present alibis.
Louise Gebardi, wife of "Machine Gun Jack," has been dubbed the
"Blonde Alibi" by newspaper reporters in Chicago. Jack "Legs" Diamond quickly abandoned his first crude habit of murdering potential
witnesses in order to perfect perjured alibis. Diamond was credited by
the police with twenty murders, but New York was unable to prove
even a simple case of assault against him because of faked alibis.
Criminals have learned well the advice Deputy Sheriff Nardi gave
Tony Coletto. Tony, after being arrested in Cleveland, asked the deputy what to do.
"Well," said Nardi, "you'd better set up an alibi."
"What do you mean by alibi?" asked Tony.
"Why a story-telling lies," replied the deputy.
Telling lies-that is perhaps the definition that most judges in
criminal courts would give. A judge who has been on the bench in
Baltimore for over ten years says an alibi is so often palpably false that
most judges are likely to disbelieve perfectly truthful evidence for that
purpose.
What, then, is the solution to this flood of perjury? The approach
toward solving the problem has been much clouded by a lot of romantic
twaddle about constitutional rights and self-incriminating evidence. The
solution is simple. Defendants who plan to rely on an alibi should be
required to give the prosecution advance notice of the alibi.
Surprise plays an important part in the use of the alibi. After the
prosecution has presented its case, there will come a dramatic succession of
evidence toward the close of the defense to prove that the defendant was
not at the scene of the crime, but was somewhere else. If we eliminate
this surprise element and say to the defense, "It's time you played
square," fewer known criminals will escape their just punishment.
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So far we have placed all the protection about the criminal and none
about society. We permit the defendant to know in advance exactly
what the state intends to prove, and who the witnesses are. But society
knows neither the defense nor the defense witnesses until they appear in
court. The cases which I have cited, cases which, incidentally, are the
common run of any criminal court, illustrate well the necessity of making
faked alibis impossible.
A perjured alibi not only aborts justice, it also creates a popular
sense of cynicism of and disrespect for the courts. What person reading
of the Potter murder case is not painfully aware that our criminal procedure encourages perjury?
Hymie Martin was indicted for the murder in Cleveland of William
Potter on February 3, 1931. Ohio authorities sought to extradite Martin from Pittsburgh, where he was arrested. Martin caused a habeas
corpus writ to be issued for his release. At the hearing on this writ, he
produced witnesses who swore that he had come into a store in Pittsburgh
and paid them a bill on the night of February 3rd.
The writ was refused and Martin was sent to Ohio to stand trial
for murder. At this trial, none of the Pittsburgh witnesses was produced. Instead, other witnesses swore that Martin was in Akron, Ohio,
on the night of February 3rd.
Without being prepared, without any notice, a district attorney
must be ready instantly to combat such bald face lies as occurred in that
case. If he fails, and the chances are that it is seldom he can succeed, a
criminal has escaped the law once again.
The advance notice of alibi law is designed to give society an equal
chance. By requiring the defendant to give notice in advance of any
alibi he intends to claim, the prosecution is able to check on the alibi and
the witnesses just as the defense has been able to check on the indictment
and the state's witnesses.
If the advance notice of alibi law had been in
when the Gargotta case, mentioned at the first of
the verdict would undoubtedly have been vastly
state trial, Gargotta was charged with possession of

effect in Kansas City
this article, occurred,
different. After the
stolen army guns.

When the detective repeated his tale about the mistaken tagging of
guns, a federal grand jury promptly indicted him for perjury, and the
court sentenced him to four years in the penitentiary. Federal agents
investigated the life of the woman in the case so thoroughly that she
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failed to appear as a witness in the federal trial.
five thousand dollar fine and three years in prison.
At the time, if Gargotta
of alibi in the state case, the
check the facts before trial.
murder, not for possession of
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Gargotta received a

had been compelled to give advance notice
district attorney would have been able to
Gargotta would have been sentenced for
stolen army guns.

Michigan and Ohio have had the advance notice of alibi law for a
number of years. Has it proved practical there? Has perjury been
reduced? Michigan reports that since the enactment of the law, alibi
defenses are very few. A great increase of convictions where alibis have
been offered has been noticed. Police and prosecuting officials attribute
this increase to the fact that an inquiry is now permitted into the alleged
alibi prior to trial, which inquiry makes possible the refutation of false
alibis.
The experience in Ohio is in accord. After this act became effective,
the number of alibi defenses was reduced to a minimum and the popularity of this mode of defense waned. Criminals and lawyers were impressed with the fact that an alibi defense refuted in open court is worse
than no defense at all. The requirement of advance notice, moreover,
took away the most valued aspect of this defense-the surprise element.
With no opportunity to check on the truth or falsity of the claim, the
prosecution is little able to combat this surprise attack. No longer was
there a sudden popping up of witnesses to swear the defendant out of his
troubles. No longer was the state thrown into confusion by the defense
claiming an alibi near the close of trial.
The advance notice of alibi law has been urged for adoption of all

of the states by the American Bar Association and by the Association of
Grand Jurors of New York County. Prior to the 1935 session of the
state legislatures, four states had this law on their statute books. Urged
by the American Bar Association, state and local bar associations caused
the introduction of this act into fourteen state legislatures in 1936. And
at this time at least six more states have passed an advance notice of alibi
defense act. Congress recently enacted such a statute. Some progress
has been made, but more is essential before perjury in criminal cases will
be at a minimum.
You suggest that perjury prosecutions will be the cure? -Not at all.
Less than one per cent of all the criminal cases in New York in one year
were for perjury; yet perjury undoubtedly occurred in 75 per cent of the
criminal trials. Of 300 persons charged with perjury in New York over
a ten year period, 225 were discharged, 16 acquitted, and 59 convicted, a
large percentage of the convictions resulting from guilty pleas. This
percentage seems to follow more or less generally throughout the country.
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The reasons why perjury is so infrequently punished is the hesitancy of judges to convict persons suspected of perjury; the apathy of
prosecuting attorneys; the technicalities of the law; the refusal of grand
juries to indict and of petit juries to convict; the severe but ineffective
punishment provided by law.
No, indictment for perjury is not the solution to this problem. In
the first place, it' is much better to prevent perjury than deliberately to
encourage it and then punish the offender. In the second place, as has
been indicated, it is hopeless to eradicate it by prosecution. Whenever
self-interest interjects itself into a case, perjury, if unrestrained, will likewise be interjected. That is the natural thing.
Eliminate the invitation to perjury by making falsification virtually
impossible and perjury will, to a large extent, likewise be eliminated.
No doubt that there are many cases where the alibi is sincere and honest.
In that event, a defendant need have no fear. The checking of his story
will inure to his benefit, either resulting in a lack of prosecution or in
strengthening, not weakening, his case.
The alibi defense is moth-eaten. Dickens poked fun at it in his
"Pickwick Papers." When poor Pickwick was helplessly attempting to
defend suit brought by Widow Bardwell's barristers, Sam Weller, in his
efforts to be helpful, suggested to Pickwick's lawyers that they have recourse to the last ditch of an "allebye."
In Samuel Warren's classic
novel, "Ten Thousand a Year," the benevolently fraudulent Mr. Quirk
of the London law firm of Quirk, Gammon Z4 Snap lived in a suburban
mansion named Alibi House. Mark Twain has amused thousands of
his readers with his broadsides at the alibi. Even judges on the bench
cannot resist the temptation to joke about it.
In one of the western states during the Volstead era, an extensive
bootleg outfit, with counterfeit labels of the most expensive brands of
whisky was found on the defendant's place.
The whisky produced,
however, was made from raw alcohol, flavoring, and coloring matter.
The defendant pleaded an alibi.
Said the judge: "The defendant furnished some testimony having
an appearance of genuineness about equal to that of his brands of liquor,
which, if accepted as genuine, would authorize a verdict of not guilty."
Is it not time to accept the recommendation of the American Bar
Association and similar organizations and introduce a little genuineness
into criminal evidence? The alibi defense law is not intended as a
panacea for all ills of criminal law. But it will reduce perjury. It will
permit the state to be prepared as well as the defense. And, most important of all, it will aid criminal procedure in recapturing the respect due it.
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The Federal Rules from the
Standpoint of the '
Colorado Code
By PHILIP S. VAN CISE*
This is one of the addresses which were delivered at the Judicial Conference of the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. The address of President Robert L. Stearns hag been
previously published in the Rocky Mountain Law Review. Other lectures will be printed
in subsequent issues. Judge Alfred Murrah's address appears in the July issue of the
American Bar Association Journal.

The Federal Rules are the vintage of 1938, the Colorado Code that
of 1887. The latter was patterned largely on the Field Code of New
York, which had been hastily drafted and rushed through the New York
legislature to take advantage of a waning reform movement. The Rules
are the result of three years study by a very eminent advisory committee
selected by the Supreme Court of the United States, which was adequately financed in its research.
The Rules were adopted as a unit. So was the Code, but many
amendments have been engrafted upon it by subsequent legislatures, as
well as by the Supreme Court.
In 1938 the Colorado Bar Association voted to merge the Colorado
Code, as far as practicable, with the Federal Rules. Since then a committee of the Colorado bar, with no funds except for printing and postage,
has been wrestling with the problem. Its first draft has been completed,
and early in July the second draft should be mailed to every member of
the Colorado bar.
The Federal Rules are a combination of the old federal equity rules
and statutes, the present English system and the state codes. The Colorado Code was a revolt against common law pleading. Yet despite
statements therein that it was to be liberally construed, the influence of
common law decisions was long evident in the construction of its provisions. That same tendency has been reflected in a few of the federal decisions on the Rules.
In considering the Federal Rules in relation to the Code, we must
ascertain, first, whether or not the Federal Rules are all-inclusive; second,
whether they themselves incorporate the state practice to any extent; and,
third, whether certain state statutes or decisions not mentioned in the
Rules are controlling irrespective of the Rules. Then we will consider
the Rules and the state practice.
*Chairman Colorado Bar Association Committee on Merging the Code with the
Federal Rules.
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It states:

"these rules govern the procedure * * * in all suits of a civil nature *
* *

with the exceptions stated in Rule 81." Rule 81 then specifically itemizes the excluded exceptions. So now we might state: "Here in these
86 Rules we have all the procedure."
However, we soon find that this is optimistic, because Rule 64 says,
"all remedies providing for seizure of person or property * * * are available under the circumstances and in the manner provided by law of the
state in which the district court is held." Therefore, in arrest, attachment, garmishment, replevin and similar remedies resort must be had to
the state code of civil procedure. But this is not all. The state law also
controls, by Rule 4, constructive service of process; by Rule 17 (b),
capacity to sue or be sued; and by Rule 69 (a), execution and supplementary proceedings. Hence the Rules do refer to state provisions and
require us constantly to refer to the Code in matters so identified.
We now come to our third question-are there any state statutes or
decisions which are not mentioned in the Rules which control procedure?
The answer is yes, there are many such, and each district will face its
own set, which may be entirely different from those in any other district.
This occurs when these statutes and decisions affect substantive law, and
they control, even if in direct contradiction of the Rules. This is because
the much discussed opinion in Erie Railroad vs. Tompkins, 304 U. S.
64, 82 L. Ed. 1188, was decided after the advisory committee had made
its report, and in no way could this decision have been contemplated by
it. This case holds that in matters of substantive law where the claim
arises under the state law, not only are the federal courts bound by the
interpretation placed by the state courts upon the statutes of the state,
but are also bound by the state construction of the common and nonstatutory law of the state.
Therefore, in drafting a complaint or answer based upon state
statutes or practice, whether statutory or common law, the practitioner
must first examine the decisions of the state to ascertain the substantive
law, and then he should see that his complaint or answer sets forth the
requirements thereof.
So far we have found only two places in Colorado where these
matters of substantive law might apply to pleading. The first is the
Colorado statute on libel and slander, Section 75 of the Code. It provides that the defendant in his answer may allege any mitigating circumstances to reduce the amount of the damages. This we believe to be substantive law, so we amended Rule 8 (c) on affirmative defenses,. and
added a sentence, "Any mitigating circumstances to reduce the amount
of damage shall be affirmatively pleaded."
The second instance is the difference between the statutes of limita-
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tions on causes of action arising in- Colorado and those arising in a f oreign state. Rule 2 says that a civil action is commenced by filing a complaint, and the Colorado statutes on limitations in all causes of action
arising in Colorado have something to the effect that the action is barred
unless commenced in a certain number of years. Hence, filing a complaint would toll the statute, under either Rule or Code. But Section
17, Chapter 102, Volume 3, C. S. A., states, "when a cause * * * arises
in another state or territory or in a foreign country, and by the laws
thereof an action cannot be maintained against a person by reason of the
lapse of time, an action thereon shall not be maintained against him in
this state." If in that foreign state the law requires a summons to be
served to bar the statute, the fact that it was not served must be pleaded,
and then Rule 2 would not apply.
To the same effect we find the federal decisions holding that if any
of the various affirmative defenses in Rule 8 (c) must, under state law,
be negatived in the complaint, the state rule must prevail.
In Illinois and New York the statutes require the plaintiff in a
damage suit to plead and prove his freedom from contributory negligence. This was held substantive law, which must be followed: Francis
vs. Humphrey (D. C. Ill.), 1939, 25 Fed. Supp. 1; Schoff us. Muller
Dairies (D. C. N. Y.), 1938, 25 Fed. Supp. 20.
In matters of evidence and procedure therein, we likewise find that
where substantive law enters in, the state decisions control. One Colorado rule comes to mind.
In an unbroken line of decisions, from Knox vs. McFarren, 4 Colo.
586, to Fleming vs. McFerson, 94 Colo. 1, the Colorado Supreme Court
has held that a party has the right to rely upon a recorded deed, and that
the burden of showing that he is not a bona fide purchaser for value is
upon the one so asserting. This is the same as the Texas rule. And the
Supreme Court of the United States, in Cities Service Oil Co. vs. Dunlap
(1939), 84 L. Ed. 185, held in an action to quiet title by the holder of
the recorded deed that the burden of proving those facts was on the
respondent.
So much for the incompleteness of the Rules, and the necessity for
outside study in certain cases.
Now let us look at the problem; can the Rules be merged with the
Code under our state practice and customs so as to form one instrument?
We attempted to answer this question by using the Rules as far as possible, but retained the Colorado provisions where we believed that the
lawyers overwhelmingly prefer them to the Rules, or where the Constitution of Colorado so requires. Then we added the Code provisions
omitted from the Rules and thus combined and merged the Rules and the
Code into a complete plan for civil procedure. But this only applied to
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civil actions. Special proceedings, in the main, are still left in a class by
themselves, as at present under both Rules and Code.
Some of our problems, and objections to a complete merger, will
readily become apparent upon an examination of the two procedures.
Rule 3 provides that the complaint shall be filed and thereafter,
under Rule 4,the clerk issues the summons. But the lawyers of Colorado have always been empowered by statute to issue the summons themselves. About 1912 the Supreme Court made a rule limiting the issuance of summons to the clerk, and such a protest arose from the bar that
it was quickly repealed. The advantage of the practice is that in case of
an emergency a lawyer can forthwith get out a summons and serve the
defendant, and this is of particular value in a large city or when the lawyer does not live in the county seat. Hence the Colorado practice was
retained and the lawyer can issue the summons. However, despite the
Code, many lawyers wonder about the constitutional right of a lawyer
to issue a summons, which is a court process in the name of "The People
of the State of Colorado."
. Now for constructive service of process and those matters mentioned
in Rules 17, 64 and 69, where the Rules follow the state practice. That
was rather an easy job. All we did was to take these portions of the
Code, attempt to harmonize their provisions with the other language of
the Rules, and insert them in their respective places. Yet to our amazement no other state has handled this situation in this manner. Arizona,
which has adopted the Federal Rules almost in toto, in its Rule 64 uses
almost the exact federal words: "all remedies providing for seizure of
person or property * * * are available under the circumstances and in the
manner provided by the law of the state." In their drafts Oregon says
that these remedies are available as "now provided by law," and Rhode
Island makes things easy with the expression "by the law of this state."
Those three states, therefore, require the use of another volume to ascertain just what is the remedy, and thus their new Rules do not make a
complete Code.
Rule 5 (b), on how service is made, leaves too much room for
argument when it states that the paper may be left with "some person of
A fifteen-year-old boy might possess age
suitable age and discretion."
but not discretion. The Colorado Code fixed fifteen years, but the committee changed it to eighteen years, hoping that both age and discretion
would thereby be secured, but in any event stopping a possible dispute as
to construction.
Now we come to a provision which has given us more trouble than
any other, and that is Rule 5 (d), on filing and serving, and Rule 12 (a),
(e) and (f), on defenses. The Rules fix most dates from the time of
service. But this opens the door to disputes as to when service was
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actually made. Hence the committee decided that time should be fixed
by the date of filing, about which there could be no argument. This
resulted in many amendments which in several instances took a lot of
time to study and correlate.
Rule 8, "General Rules of Pleading," has been very much construed by the federal courts. Its subdivision (e) (1) has resulted in
considerable conflict of decision and doubt as to whether the Rules permit
pleading on information and belief and whether ultimate facts or conclusions of law can be set up either in the complaint or in the answer.
This subdivision now reads:
"Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise and
direct. No technical forms of pleading or motions are required."
To get away from the present uncertainty of decision, we have changed
it to read:
"Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise and
direct. When a pleader is without direct knowledge allegations
may be made upon information and belief. No technical forms of
pleading or motions are required. Pleadingsotherwise meeting the
requirements of these rules shall not be considered objectionable for
failure to state ultimate facts, as distinguished from conclusions of
law." (The italics are the additions.)
Rule 10 (a) states how parties shall be named, but makes no provisions for parties whose names are unknown or for unknown parties.
We therefore added these sentences:
"A party whose name is not known shall be designated by any
name and the words 'whose true name is unknown'. In an action
in rem unknown parties shall be designated as 'all unknown persons
who claim any interest in the subject matter of this action.' "
Except possibly by inference, the rules make no provision for attacking an answer for insufficiency in law (our old demurrer practice).
Hence we added to Rule 12 (f), which is captioned "Motion to Strike,"
these words:
"The objection that an answer or separate defense therein fails to
state a legal defense may be raised by motion filed under this subdivision."
Let us now take up the deposition and discovery provisions in
Chapter V of the Rules. As far as we are advised, these are by far the
most advanced steps taken to date in any jurisdiction. Yet we think
they still have two very serious defects, as well as one which is too
expensive for the average litigant.
Rule 26 allows unlimited right to take a deposition after answer,
but only by leave of court before that time. Our committee believes that
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this is an unnecessary and expensive practice. In Colorado if an attorney
lives outside of Denver he would have the extra expense of a trip to the
city to get this order. If the judge is absent, nothing can be done until
his return, unless we bother one of the judges of the Circuit Court of
Appeals. And in states where none of them is in residence that relief is
not available. The speaker has known too many cases where service of
a summons, accompanied by a notice to take deposition, has brought
many a crooked defendant to time right now, where delay would have
been fatal. That absolute right to take depositions at any time after the
service of the summons is now in our Code and we have preserved it.
The second defect in Rule 26 is that we believe that it is applicable
to "actions" alone, and not to "special proceedings." Our Code limits
depositions in special proceedings so that they can only be taken after an
issue of fact has been raised. But this is very unjust. The federal district courts do not have probate proceedings, but the state courts do.
Under Colorado practice a will contest arises from a caveat to the petition to probate the will and the answer thereto. The issue of fact is only
between the caveat and the answer. Suppose an important witness is at
the point of death. No legal deposition can be taken until that answer
is filed, and if the proponent of the will can successfully stall for time
he wins his case by the death of the witness. Many other instances could
be cited to show just as great a necessity for the immediate taking of a
deposition in a special proceeding as in an action. Hence we have provided in Rule 81 that Rules 26 to 37 shall apply to all special proceedings
so that the benefit of discovery is available to all litigants.
This, of course, raises the entire question of how special proceedings
should be handled. We believe that so far as practicable they should be
covered by the Rules. We have not yet been able to decide on the language to show when they are covered and when they are not. We
expect to settle that matter at our three-day committee institute next
week.
Now for an expensive section of the Rules. In small towns good
stenographers are scarce, and hiring an outside stenographer at folio rates
is always costly. Hence we felt that Rule 28 (c) prohibiting the taking
of depositions by an employee of an, attorney was an unnecessary hardship to litigants, and that portion of the subdivision was stricken by us.
Under Rule 30 (b) parties have plenty of protection and can secure an
order for another stenographer if they believe the one designated will be
incompetent or unfair.
It is always much easier to criticize than to construct. And so while
drafting a Rule is a-very difficult job, finding flaws in it later, when a
lawyer is called upon to determine the meaning of a Rule, is comparatively simple. The last word "therein" in the first sentence of Rule
36 (a) is an illustration of this.
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"At any time after the pleadings are closed, a party may serve
upon any other party a written request for the admission by the
latter of the genuineness of any relevant documents described in and
exhibited with the request or of the truth of any relevant matters
of fact set forth therein."

Does this "therein" refer to the facts set forth in the documents or
in the request? We believe it means the latter, so we have changed
"therein" to "in the request."
Rule 43 (b) provides that the "managing agent" of a party may
be called for cross examination. But that phase is not defined and hence
is uncertain. Under London Guarantee & Accident Co. vs. Officer, 78
Colo. 441, 444, it was held that the term "managing agent" meant just
one party, which is too narrow a construction. Hence, we defined the
term in our Rule 110 by stating "a superintendent, overseer, foreman,
sales director, or person occupying a similar position, may be considered
a managing agent for the purposes of these rules." In Rule 43 (b) we
also added to the list of employers whose employees could be cross examined the words "body politic," so that if a suit was by or against any
municipality, county or state agency, cross examination of its officers or
agents would be proper.
We very much preferred the appellate procedure of the Rules to the
writ of error practice of the Code. But the Colorado Constitution provides for writ of error from the County Court to the Supreme Court,
and for that reason in Colorado in 1912 writ of error practice was substituted for appeals. Hence we adhered to that practice rather than the
federal procedure.
However, in Rule 75 the federal requirement in subdivision (b)
for filing two copies of the stenographer's transcript needlessly enriches
the court reporter, while the preparation of the record by the clerk under
subdivision (g) is far more expensive than the state practice.
When we got through with the Rules we had to add the Code
sections which were not covered. And now, except for the excluded
special proceedings, which we will enumerate in Rule 81, our proposed
Rules are a completed merger of the Rules and the Code. In the main
we have made one system of practice for both courts, in the main both
federal and Colorado decisions will be applicable to the subdivisions of
the Rules because we have followed the same structural system, and in
the main we believe that our proposed Rules will be a great advance on
the present Code.
In any event, if adopted, the proposed Colorado procedure will be
enacted, as were the federal measures, by rule of court, instead of by act
of the legislature. If they work well, they will be retained; if they are
faulty, they can easily be amended. And that step, the governing of
procedure by the courts instead of the lawmakers, is the great move forward both in federal and state practice.
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Yet there is one danger signal ahead of both sets of rules. The
Federal Rules now are, and ours, if adopted, will be, based upon power
allegedly conferred by the legislature. Personally, the speaker believes
the court has this power inherently, but has been unwilling to exercise it.
Passing that point, however, future legislation is very apt to be enacted
both by Congress and state assemblies, contradictory of the Rule provisions.
One interesting case in point is the action of Congress in regard to
patent procedure. In 1897 (Title 35, Sec. 69, U. S. C. A.) an act was
passed which provided, among other matters, that
"In any action for infringement the defendant may plead the
general issue, and, having given notice in writing to the plaintiff or
his attorney thirty days before, may prove on trial any one or more
of the following special matters."
(Then follow five paragraphs, including fraud.)
This was still on the statute books when the Rules went into effect
in September, 1938, and was repealed by them.
Yet on August 5, 1939, Congress re-enacted the same statute practically verbatim! We don't know why 'it was re-passed. But we do
know that under that statute you simply deny infringement in your
answer and then give notice, 30 days before trial, of what you are going
to prove. The rules are different. Under 12 (b) you must assert every
defense in the answer, and under 9 (b) fraud must be stated with particularity. We know of no decision on this point, but right now we are
faced with the interpretation of this statute in a patent case in Nebraska.
We hope we are right, as we followed the rule and disregarded the statute, on the theory that Congress, having delegated its power to control
procedure to the Supreme Court, cannot indirectly reassume it.
But the fact that such a statute has been passed, and that many
more will be passed in the future, illustrates the need for vigilance. The
courts now have power, either inherently, as the Colorado Supreme
Court has held in Kohlnman vs. People, 89 Colo. 8, 32, or by the federal
and Colorado statutes specifically conferring it, to control procedure. If
this right rests upon statute alone, the bar must see that that power
remains in the courts, the American bar must check the procedure enactments of Congress, and the state bars the procedure statutes of their
legislatures. We have Rules which are intended to facilitate the rights of
litigants at a minimum of cost. We, the bar, will endeavor to keep our
legislators in line, not to overturn these Rules. And we, the bar, on
behalf of ourselves and our clients, look to you, the judges who construe
the laws, liberally to interpret these Rules so that in fact they will lend
themselves "to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
every action." (Rule 1.)

Opportunity

Is In Denver
By WIAM R. KELLY
The Colorado Bar Association dues-paid membership has trebled
in the three years since its reconstruction. There are now over 1,100
members. This averages 2 out of every 3 of the 1,550 lawyers in the
State of Colorado as members. The Colorado Bar Association can now
rightfully claim to speak for a majority of the Colorado bar-a claim it
could not make three years ago. More than that-7 out of every 10 of
the lawyers in Colorado, outside of Denver, are members of the state
association, and 6 out of every 10 lawyers in Denver are members of the
state association. These are "round" figures, based on Martindale's Directory. In this total are included judges as well as practitioners. The
criterion has been to include those whose life activities depend upon the
fact that they are members of the great profession.
Lawyers out in the state have been a little more prompt than those
in Denver in joining the reorganized association. "Country" lawyers
supposed that Denver lawyers were more organization minded, but it
seems that about 360 lawyers in Denver, men who profit because they
are members of the profession, are neither members of their local bar

association, nor of the state bar association. Not that the out-in-state
lawyers can throw stones. It is a fact that some who have profited most
out of the legal profession are not those who do their share in supporting

its organization.

At any rate, we want to get the membership ratio of

lawyers in Denver equal to that of those outside of Denver. By joining
us, they will help us while helping themselves. The regeneration of the
Colorado Bar Association had its main leadership in Denver.

This is a day when the unorganized in any profession or country
are going down in the contest with the better organized. It is time for
lawyers to look about and see what other groups have been doing while
we were complacent. We were organizing others, but not ourselves. In
five states bordering Colorado, they have the integrated bar; that is,
every lawyer must be a member, and 'must pay annual dues, which are
about double those in Colorado. We have been hoping an integrated
bar would be unnecessary in Colorado, and that we could meet the problem by voluntary membership.
In our last fiscal year, 70% of the income of the Colorado Bar Association was taken for printing and postage expense of the monthly DICTA
and the annual proceedings. Probably we should get in line with what
neighboring states are doing. We would like to render more service to
the members of the bar in Colorado. Every lawyer should have a part
*Of Greeley, President of the Colorado Bar AssoCiation.
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in it. If we had their dues of three dollars ($3.00) each, from the 500
lawyers in Colorado who have not joined, it would go a long way
toward solving our problem.
The increased attendance at Legal Institutes held over the state this
year shows that lawyers value the Colorado Bar Association.
The voluntary response of Colorado lawyers to the code revision
printing expense to supplement that being contributed monthly by the
association has been good. Over 200 lawyers in the state, about half of
them from outside Denver,, have responded with subscriptions from one
dollar to twenty-five dollars. This will pay part of the cost of mimeographing, printing and mailing a copy of the draft to the 1,500 lawyers
in the state. This alone would have taken half of the present gross annual income of the association.
Our hope for new members and solution of our balancing of our
budget and extending beneficial activities of the association is mainly in
the capital city of Denver. A Denver lawyer, Charles M. Sheldon, is
the chairman of our membership committee. The other members of his
committee (made up as the by-laws require, of one from each Congressional District) are: Frank D. Allen, Akron; Paul L. Littler, Montrose;
Raphael J. Moses, Alamosa; and John W. O'Hagan, Greeley. They
are a good committee. Our hope is in them.
The Ninth Judicial Bar Association met in Glenwood Springs on
June 22, and elected officers for the forthcoming year. M. J. Mayes of
Glenwood Springs was selected as president; Winbourn MacDonald of
Meeker and Ross I. Newmann of Aspen were chosen Vice-Presidents
and Carl W. Fulghum was elected Secretary and Treasurer.
In conjunction with the annual meeting of the local bar association
a legal institute was also held. The afternoon session was opened by
John R. Clark, who introduced Albert J. Gould of Denver. Mr. Gould
spoke on "Tax High-lights for the Busy Lawyer". The evening meeting commenced with a banquet held at the Colorado Hotel, with C. H.
Darrow, retiring president presiding. Louis A. Hellerstein of Denver
addressed the institute on "Chattel Mortgages in Colorado."
A two-day institute on Taxation will be held at Boulder under
the auspices of the Colorado School of Law on July 20th and 2 1st.
The speakers will include George Bogart, author of Bogart on Trusts
and other books; Thomas Reid Powell; Charles F. Rittenhouse and
John MacGuire. All lawyers planning to attend the Institute should
register at the office of the Dean of the Law School. Special arrangements are being made to house the attorneys attending at a very nominal
cost. Full particulars concerning the Institute and the cost may be
obtained from the Dean's office.
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Code Revision Progressing Swiftly; Contributors
to Fund Listed
The committee on Code Revision of the State Bar Association
met in Denver on June 20, 21 and 22 to discuss the second proposed
revision of the rules. The first draft of the rules was placed in the
hands of the committee approximately two months ago. According to
Mr. Philip Van Cise, Chairman of the Code Revision Committee, the
second draft of the rules will be placed in the hands of every lawyer in
the state by August first. Members attending the three-day meeting
in Denver went over the rules with the idea to correct terminology,
made improvements in the first draft and to insure consistency throughout the entire rules. The program of revising the Colorado code called
for an expenditure of approximately two thousand dollars, some of
which is already assumed and paid by the State Bar Association. To
meet this extra expense President Kelly, acting under the authority of
the Board of Governors, requested various lawyers to subscribe to a
special fund to be used for revising the Colorado Code. A list* of
the subscribers to this fund follows:
Ben L. Garman, Holyoke
Gilbert A. Walker, Steamboat Springs
Clay R. Appel, Greeley
Gabriel, Mills U Mills, Denver
Stanley S. Rudnick, Denver
W. W. Platt, Alamosa
Percy S. Morris, Denver
James W. Preston, Pueblo
Moses VI Moses, Alamosa
Lyman P. Weld, Longmont
Ellis, Melville £ Winner, Denver
Arlington Taylor, Ft. Morgan
Morris Rutland, Denver
P. D. Nelson, Berthoud
Frank L. Fetzer, Denver
Lewis EdGrant, Denver
George W. Bruce, Montrose
Elmer L. Brock, Denver
Berman & Holland, Denver
Fred W. Stover, Ft. Collins
Leonard L. Aitken, Jr., Denver
Chas. E. Southard, Greeley
Barney L. Whatley, Denver
John 0. Rames, Denver
Bryan L. Whitehead, Denver
*As of June 20, 1940.

Adams £4 Gast, Pueblo
John A. CrossLoeland
Jackson M. Seawell, Denver
Con K. O'Byrne, Denver
George A. Epperson, Ft. Morgan
.Albert J. Gould, Denver
Wilbur F. Denious, Denver
Warwick M. Downing, Denver
Jas. D. Parriott, Denver
Henry McAllister, Denver
Alfred A. Arraj, Springfield
John I. Palmer, Saguache
Benjamin F. Koperlik, Pueblo
K. L. Eldred, Canon City
Howard Roepnack, Denver
G. C. Twombly, Ft. Morgan
Glenn S. Thompson, Yuma
William E. Hutton, Denver
Fairfield £4 Woods, Denver
H. H. Hartman, Ft. Collins
Shuteran £3 Robinson, Denver
Bannister F3Bannister, Denver
Y. A. Land, Denver
William R. Kelly, Greeley
Floyd F. Walpole, Denver
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Frank D. Allen, Akron
J. H. Burkhardt, Denver
Ralph S. Newcomer, Boulder
George J. Bailey, Ft. Collins
Hellerstein l Gertz, Denver
E. D. Milliken, Denver
Earl T. Carroll, Springfield
John N. Mabry, Trinidad
Eugene A. Bond, Leadville
Bryant EdStubbs, Montrose
Harry S. Petersen, Pueblo
Frank Delaney, Glenwood Springs
Aldrich FSHackethal, Idaho Springs
Stoton R. Stephenson, Ft. Morgan
Robert G. Porter, Gunnison
Win. Albion Carlson, Greeley
William B. Paynter, Brush
L. W. Newby, Longmont
Hugh E. Crawford, Colorado Springs
Douglas McHendrie, Denver
William R. Eaton, Denver
Davis 1 Wallbank, Denver
Milton Smith, Denver
George M. Corlett, Monte Vista
Wm. Hall Thompson, Greeley
Laurence DeMuth. Boulder
Tupper, Smith &4Holmes, Grand Junction
H. E. Munson, Sterling
Blount, January and Yegge, Denver
David M. Ralston, Trinidad
Carpenter f Videon, Hayden
Moynihan-Hughes, Montrose
Harry E. Mast, Ordway
Hughes & Dorsey, Denver
M. M. Bulkeley, Wray
Francis E. Bouck, Denver
H. D. Henry, Denver
Edward D. Upham, Denver
Stinemeyer & Stinemeyer, Canon City
Lindsey & Larwill, Denver
Dines, Dines f Holme, Denver
Frank L. Moorhead, Boulder
Charles Frank Stewart, Gunnison
Goudy F Shaw, Monte Vista
Frank J. Green, Greeley
Thomas A. Nixon, Greeley
Robert G. Smith, Greeley
McCreery V3Waldo, Greeley
M. E. H. Smith, Greeley
John W. Henderson, Greeley
Houtchens F3Houtchens, Greeley
Emil B. Hatch, Greeley
J. P. Thomas, Jr., Canon City

Claude W. Corlett, Monte Vista
Robert W. Steele, Denver
John W. Hogan, Greeley
Ralph Waldo, Greeley
Haywood & Haynie, Grand Junction
McMullin, Sternbert & Helman, Grand
Junction
William Weiser, Grand Junction
Quiat, Ginsberg ZI Creamer, Denver
Wood & Fuller, Denver
John I. Green, Antonito
Bennett fd Wendelken, Colorado Springs
Leon H. Snyder, Colorado Springs
Victor W. Hungerford, Colorado Springs
David P. Strickler, Colorado Springs
H. T. McGarry, Colorado Springs
J. A. Carruthers, Colorado Springs
Frank L. Grant, Denver
Herbert L. Strang, Montrose
E. C. Holt, Pueblo
William E. Anderson, Pueblo
George B. Baker, Pueblo
James W. Booth, Pueblo
Charles M. Rose, Pueblo
Julius Sterling, Pueblo
C. C. Bellinger, Pueblo
James G. Elliott, Pueblo
Charles F. Keen, Pueblo
Langdon &iBarbrick, Pueblo
Warren W. Lattimer, Pueblo
William L. Lloyd, Pueblo
Ralph L. Neary, Pueblo
Sperry S. Packard, Pueblo
Sam Parlapiano, Pueblo
R. A. Payton, Pueblo
Joseph L. Peterson, Pueblo
H. P. Vories, Pueblo
James D. Geissinger, Pueblo
C. B.'Marmaduke, Jr., Pueblo
John H. Marsalis, Pueblo
John L. Faricy, Pueblo
Harry Leddy, Pueblo
V. G. Seavy, Pueblo
Matt J. Kochevar, Pueblo
McHendrie, Burris, Pointer 9 Ribar, Pueblo
F. R. Botleman, Pueblo
Phelps & Gobin, Pueblo
M. F. Miller, La Junta
Perry Williams, Rocky Ford
L. Thulemeyer, La Junta
W. L. Gobin, Rocky Ford
Judge E. W. McDaniel, La Junta
Clyde T. Davis, La Junta

Contracts; Live Stock; Leases; Partido Contracts. No. 14611. Decided May 27, 1940. First National Bank v. Matteson. District
Court, El Paso County. Hon. John E. Little, Judge. On Rehearing. Affirmed. En Banc.
HELD: 1. Lease of livestock considered, and held not to be a
partido contract.
2. A partido contract need not be in any set form.
3. The character of a lease is not varied by the fact that the interest of lessee is measured in cash.
4. Where one party is lessee of another's property and former
mortgages it, the mortgagee is not protected as against lessor.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard not
participating. Mr. Justice Bakke dissenting.

Water Companies; Rates; Injunction. No. 14650. Decided June 10,
1940. Board of County Commissioners, etc. v. Rocky Mountain
Water Co. District Court, Jefferson County. Hon. Robert W.
Steele, Judge. Affirmed. En Banc.
FACT: A. The Board of County Commissioners fixed the
rate to be charged by the water company for the carriage of water
through its ditch, and the company brought injunction to restrain the
enforcement of that order. The trial court enjoined the rate fixed by
the Board.
B. It was admitted that irrespective of the items of $7,000 for
"working capital" and $11,564.28 for valuation of company's plant
as a "going concern" used in fixing the base for calculation of a proper
rate, the rate was confiscatory.
HELD: 1. "Since the only thing enjoined is the enforcement
of an admittedly erroneous rate, since such items as value of structures,
equipment and operating expense are or may be variable, and since the
board may now at any time readjust this rate, we find nothing to
review."
2. The Supreme Court finds no justification for advisory suggestions.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard not
participating.
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Mandamus; Police Department; Waiver of Pension Rights; Dismissal
of ProvisionalAppointee. No. 14623. Decided May 20, 1940Edwards v. Guthner, etc. District Court, Denver. Hon. William
H. Luby, Judge. Affirmed. In Department.
HELD: 1. Where it appears that a provisional appointee employed as provisional stenographer in the Denver police department,
although over the age limit, is allowed to take and pass the civil service
examination for police operator on the condition he waive his pension
right, and where it is determined by the court that pension rights may
not be waived, the civil service commission acted properly in striking his
name from the eligible list.
2. The enforceable rules of the commission have the same effect
as law, and the commission itself must obey them.
3. The requirement of filing formal charges against one whose
name appears on the eligible list, applies only to those legally appearing
thereon.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke.
Burke concur.

Mr. Justice Knous and Mr. Justice

Mandamus; Elections; Pleading. No. 14637. Decided May 20, 1940
-People ex rel. Harper v. Ingles, et al. DistrictCourt, Las Animas
County. Hon. John L. East, Judge. Affirmed. In Department.
HELD:
1. Where a specific action is sought to be compelled by
mandamus, there must be a clear legal right to have that specific action
taken.
2. "If there is any discretion as to the taking or not taking of the
action, or if the one sought to be compelled to act has a lawful right to
require precedent action by another before acting himself, there is not a
clear case of a legal right in the relator to have the action taken until
there is a showing that such precedent action has been taken."
3. City clerk may not be compelled to certify election returns of
a certain precinct as to the vote cast for city treasurer where it appears
that there were errors in the returns of said precinct.
4.
answer.

Failure to file replication is admission of new matter set up in

Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.
Burke concur.

Mr. Justice Bouck and Mr. Justice
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Appeal and Error; Mandate; Constitutional Law; Full Faith and
Credit. No. 14534. Decided February 13, 1940-Meyer etc. v.
Milliken et at. District Court, Denver. Hon. Robert W. Steele,
Judge. Affirmed. En Banc.
HELD: 1. Where the supreme court, in considering a case upon
appeal, enters an order for a mandate, such mandate is to be observed,
and the inferior tribunal must yield obedience to it, yet such obedience
is not to be blind, but an intelligent obedience.
2. Action of trial court examined and found to be a sufficient
compliance with remittitur.
3. A court of this state unquestionably has the power to enjoin
the enforcement of a foreign judgment between citizens of this state
who are before the court and in the state where the judgment is palpably
void upon its face.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Justice Bock not participating.

Municipal Corporations; Torts; Negligence; Damages; Sidewalks. No.
14560. Decided January 22, 1940-Higgins v. City of Boulder.
District Court, Boulder County. Hon. Claude C. Coffin, Judge.
Reversed. In Department.
HELD:
1. Verdict for $4,500.00 in favor of plaintiff, 76,
against City of Boulder for injuries resulting from fall at night over
wire bench on sidewalk on courthouse block, upheld.
2. "The duty of the city was to maintain this sidewalk in a
reasonably safe condition for one using it in a proper manner," and
such duty extended to the entire sidewalk.
3. "Whether an obstruction not a nuisance per se is such in fact
is generally for the jury."
4. "Negligence is generally for the jury, and always so when the
measure of duty is reasonable care."
5. Where sidewalk surrounds courthouse block and latter is
central one in the city, the city had constructive notice of obstruction
thereon, even if its officers were ignorant of it, if, in the exercise of
ordinary diligence they should have known it.
6. The question of constructive notice depends upon the facts
and circumstances of the particular case, and ordinarily is for the jury.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and
Mr. Justice Bakke concur.
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right now we can accurately estimate what it
will cost to heat your home next winter with

When you get that estimate, you are going to be very pleasantly
surprised. For you win find that there is no reason for not having
ga heat-and EVERY REASON for enjoying its many advanfages and conveniences in your home.
Lot us tell you why it is to YOUR ADVANTAGE to have
your gas heating installation made NOW, during the summer
months. How you can avoid any rush or bother or inconvenience.
how you can have the very best work done when our workmen
are not rushed, how you can enjoy your vacation more with next
winter's heating problems solved. And you need make .
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with very low monthly payments thereaffer.

'Phone today[

No obligatio.

Public Service Companyof Colorado

A LAWYER'S VIEWPOINT
The following excerpt is taken from an address
before a meeting of the American Bankers Associ.
ation by Mr. John H. Freeman of the law firm of
Fulbright, Crooker and Freeman, of Houston,
Texas, on the subject:

ADVANTAGES OF
THE CORPORATE EXECUTOR
AND TRUSTEE
"The testator leaving a corporate executor to administer his estate
knows that his executor will be here to complete the job; that it will
be found at a definite place ready and able to perform its duties day
by day and every day until the task shall have been completed.
"Here, indeed, is a very real advantage. The duties are to be
performed at a time when the testator is no longer among the living;
lie has to depend upon the executor to do in his behalf, for his devisees
and legatees, things that are close to his heart and to which he has
dedicated a lifetime of effort."
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Each of the institutions named below acts
as Executor and Trustee:
THE COLORADO NATIONAL BANK
THE DENVER NATIONAL BANK
THE INTERNATIONAL TRUST COMPANY
THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL BANK
THE AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK
Members of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
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A LAWYER'S VIEWPOINT
The following excerpt is taken from an address
before a meeting of the American Bankers Association by Mr. John H. Freeman of the law firm of
Fulbright, Crooker and Freeman, of Houston,
Texas, on the subject:

ADVANTAGES OF
THE CORPORATE EXECUTOR
AND TRUSTEE
"The financial stability of authorized and legally qualified corpo.
rate trustees, their ability to answer for the property of beneficiaries
in their care, is not under present-day conditions even debatable or
seriously open to question.
"Not alone public regulations, restrictions, examinations, but self.
imposed limitations, additional examinations and safeguards have been
combined to make the modern trust company and trust department of
a modern bank functioning as trustee proof against loss to trust beneficiaries from malfeasance of the trustee."

S
Each of the institutions named below acts
as Executor and Trustee:
THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL BANK
THE AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK
THE COLORADO NATIONAL BANK
THE DENVER NATIONAL BANK
THE INTERNATIONAL TRUST COMPANY
Members of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
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Now You Can Get a Big,
New General Electric for
Only a Little More Than
The Very Cheapest Make!
You know there is a genuine
economy and tremendous satisfaction
in aowning
the added
best.
Today, just
few dolars

CON Rrigeratorwlti
TIONED AIR!

investment brings you all the
extra
convenience, extra quality
and extra
year of roubl~efree
service for which General Electric
refrigerators have been famous.
Come in and see lor yourselii
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